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RETURNING FAIRNESS
TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
J. ROBERT B ROWN, JR.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The paradigm shift in corporate governance over the last century has
been the removal of categorical restrictions on the board of directors in
favor of broad discretionary authority.1 With discretion, however, came
risks. Boards could use the authority to promote their own interests, rather
than the interests of shareholders. To limit this possibility, the law purported to subject directors to strict fiduciary obligations. Discretion had to
be exercised only in a manner that benefited shareholders. In particular, the
duty of loyalty triggered duties described as strict and unrelenting.2
The approach is, however, a myth—at least today. The discretion remains, but the strict and unrelenting nature of fiduciary duties has not. The
duty of care evolved into a system of process, with form replacing substance.3 The duty of loyalty ceased to be about fairness. Boards merely
needed to show the presence of a majority of independent directors, a

*
Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; www.theracetothebottom
.org. Steve Bainbridge, Barbara Black, and Nancy Rapoport provided comments on a draft of this
Article.
1. An early example was the authority to issue new classes of shares so long as the authority
existed in the articles. The changes have included the right to buy votes and to discriminate
against shareholders of the same class of stock. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Speaking with Complete
Candor: Shareholder Ratification and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 54 HASTINGS L. J.
641, 644 n.12 (2003) (discussing examples of increases in board discretion at the expense of
shareholders).
2. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). As the court in Guth stated:
The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands
that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest. The occasions for the
determination of honesty, good faith and loyal conduct are many and varied, and no
hard and fast rule can be formulated. The standard of loyalty is measured by no fixed
scale.
Id. at 510.
3. J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty without Limits: “Independent” Directors and the
Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 57 (2006-07). Any residual content to the duty
of care was eliminated with the universal adoption of waiver of liability provisions. See J. Robert
Brown, Jr. & Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only In: Contractarians, Waiver of Liability Provisions,
and the Race to the Bottom, University of Denver Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-02 (2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1087404 (discussing the provisions and their impact on fiduciary obligations).
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standard largely rendered meaningless through judicial legerdemain. Fairness, in short, was reduced to a rote head count.4
The result has been unchecked discretion. Moreover, the discretion is
not exercised randomly. Boards are typically “captured” by top officers,
particularly the CEO.5 Board authority is often better described as exercised in the best interests of management rather than shareholders.6 This
can be seen most clearly in the context of executive compensation, where
amounts paid to top officers have continued to escalate upward in an out-ofcontrol fashion.7
Some portions of the North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act
(NDPTCA/Act) address this problem.8 The Act attempts to reduce capture
by enhancing the ability of shareholders to elect their own candidates to the
board. The Act limits advance notice bylaws 9 and allows large shareholders access to the company’s proxy statement for their nominees. 10
Shareholders have the right to mandatory repayment of proxy expenses
when their candidates are elected.11
The provisions in the NDPTCA, however, are modest and unlikely to
result in significant change to board composition. For the foreseeable
future, boards of public companies, including those incorporated under the
NDPTCA, will remain captured by management. As a result, it leaves in
place a system of broad board discretion and weak fiduciary principals that
do not adequately protect the interests of shareholders.12

4. See Brown, supra note 3, at 62; see also infra note 64 and accompanying text.
5. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 51-68 (2008) (discussing ways in which a CEO “captures” the board of directors).
6. See, e.g., The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. On Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement by Alan Greenspan) (“I
made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations, specifically banks and others,
were such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the
firms.”). Managerial self interest could sometimes benefit shareholders, particularly by providing
an incentive to maintain share prices in the short term, but as the recent turmoil in the financial
markets illustrates, reliance on management self interest to protect shareholders has failed
dismally. Id.
7. See Joann S. Lublin, Persistent Pay Gains: A Survey Overview, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14,
2008, at R1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120793930504508449.html?mod=2_
1565_leftbox (study of compensation paid to CEOs).
8. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 10-35 (2007).
9. See id. § 10-35-07 (limiting advance notice bylaw to no longer than ninety days).
10. See id. § 10-35-02(8) (defining “qualified shareholder” as also including a two-year
holding period for the shares).
11. Id. § 10-35-10. This is particularly important given the Delaware Supreme Court’s
decision in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008).
12. See J. Robert Brown, The North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act and the
Delaware Advantage, July 6, 2007, http://www.theracetothebottom.org/shareholder-rights/thenorth-dakota-publicly-traded-corporations-act-and-the-de.html?SSScrollPosition=0 (noting the
failure of the NDPTCA to address fiduciary obligations of directors). Of course, the interests of
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This Article explores the demise of fiduciary obligations, emphasizing
executive compensation. Part II examines the duty of loyalty and the traditional interpretation accorded by the courts. Part III discusses the evisceration of the duty, particularly the replacement of fairness analysis with the
business judgment rule. Process, as this Article will show, has proved an
inadequate substitute for fairness. Finally, Part IV proposes a solution.
II. DECLINE OF THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
In the early days of corporate law, courts considered the risks associated with self-dealing by officers and directors so great that they treated
the transactions as voidable.13 Excessively narrow, the approach threatened
to prevent a class of transactions that could often benefit the corporation. In
response, courts gradually opted for a less restrictive test allowing the
transactions, but only if substantively and procedurally fair.14 Procedural
fairness meant approval by shareholders or disinterested directors.15 By the
mid-twentieth century, however, it was enough to show substantive fairness
irrespective of the process used,16 although the burden remained with the
board.17
shareholders may themselves be fragmented. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About
Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 577 (2006). The point is a fair one but
largely beyond the scope of this Article. Whatever differences may exist among shareholders, the
need to determine executive compensation in a manner that is designed to be fair would likely be a
widely shared view.
13. Brown, supra note 3, at 54; see also Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991) (“At
common law, a corporation’s stockholders did have the power to nullify an interested transaction,
although considerations of the transaction’s fairness appear to have played some part in judicial
decisions applying this rule.”) (internal citations omitted). Not everyone agrees with this early
characterization. See generally Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary
Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the Self-Interested Director Transaction, 41 DEPAUL L. REV.
655, 659-62 (1992) (asserting that interested director contracts were not always voidable); see also
Norwood P. Beveridge, Interested Director Contracts at Common Law: Validation Under the
Doctrine of Constructive Fraud, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 97, 98-99 (1999) (noting that Professor
Marsh’s assertion has come under attack).
14. The voidable nature of the contracts lasted until the 1960s, when many states adopted
statutes that clarified their legality. Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of
Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35, 36 (1966). If either substantively fair or
approved through the proper process, the transactions would cease to be voidable. That did not
mean, however, that the transactions were otherwise consistent with a board’s fiduciary
obligations.
15. Id. at 39-40.
[T]he general rule was that a contract between a director and his corporation was valid
if it was approved by a disinterested majority of his fellow directors and was not found
to be unfair or fraudulent by the court if challenged; but that a contract in which a
majority of the board was interested was voidable at the instance of the corporation or
its shareholders without regard to any question of fairness.
Id. (footnote omitted).
16. See Harvey Gelb, Corporate Governance and the Independence Myth, 6 WYO. L. REV.
129, 130-31 (2006) (“The general rule by the mid-twentieth century would uphold the validity of a
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Substantive fairness in many cases amounted to a straightforward
approach. The board had to show that the conflict of interest transaction
retained the “the earmarks of an arm’s length bargain.”18 In other words,
the transaction could be no more favorable than what would have been
negotiated with anyone devoid of the conflict. To establish fairness, boards
could look to reliable markets that provided a neutral and arms length price
or rely on a history of comparable transactions and payments.19
Fairness, however, was not always so easily determined. Some transactions had a unique price and were not susceptible to analysis under the
traditional tests.20 In those circumstances, the courts developed a relatively
complex approach that necessitated examination of the whole transaction.21
Appropriately labeled “entire fairness,” the review took into account the
factors and the method used to determine price.22 Specifically, fair price
required examination of “the economic and financial considerations” relied

transaction even in the absence of a disinterested director majority vote unless it was found by the
court to be unfair to the corporation.”).
17. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1222 (Del. 1999) (“Once the entire
fairness standard has been implicated, as here, the defendants, at least initially, bear the burden of
demonstrating the two basic aspects of fair dealing and fair price.”) (internal citation omitted);
Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) (“When faced with
such divided loyalties, directors have the burden of establishing the entire fairness of the
transaction to survive careful scrutiny by the courts.”); Keenan v. Eshleman, 2 A.2d 904,
908 (Del. 1938) (“In the second place, dealing as they did with another corporation of which they
were sole directors and officers, they assumed the burden of showing the entire fairness of the
transaction.”).
18. Byelick v. Vivadelli, 79 F. Supp. 2d 610, 629 (E.D. Va. 1999) (quoting Moneta v.
Willard Building Supply Co., 515 S.E.2d 277, 287 (Va. 1999)). As one commentator noted,
fairness represented what “would have been approved by a disinterested board negotiating at
arm’s length with a stranger.” Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 7
(1993).
19. See Valeant Pharms. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 750 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“The price terms
obviously cannot be justified by reference to any reliable market. Nor is there proof in the record
of substantial comparable transactions to which the court might look to find support for the
payment of bonuses of this size.”).
20. This is particularly true in the context of mergers between companies and their
controlling shareholders. See Emerald, 787 A.2d at 94-95.
21. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1179 (Del. 1995) (“Rather, it is a
standard by which the Court of Chancery must carefully analyze the factual circumstances, apply
a disciplined balancing test to its findings, and articulate the bases upon which it decides the
ultimate question of entire fairness. In some instances, however, price may predominate.”); see
also In re TD Banknorth S’holders Litig., 938 A.2d 654, 667 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Equally
fundamental is the notion that fair price and fair dealing are not viewed in isolation,’ but rather in
conjunction, and that fairness as to one prong will not necessarily sterilize a transaction or
immunize a defendant from liability.”).
22. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1163 (“In this case, because the contested action is the sale of a
company, the ‘fair price’ aspect of an entire fairness analysis requires the board of directors to
demonstrate ‘that the price offered was the highest value reasonably available under the
circumstances.’”).
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upon by the board.23 Fair dealing, in turn, “embrace[d] questions of when
the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated,
disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the
stockholders were obtained.”24
An objective test, neither prong entirely controlled the analysis. 25
Nonetheless, as a practical matter, process was a less important component.
Fair process was only relevant to the extent it related to the fairness (or
unfairness) of the price.26 Even with a flawed process, the amount paid
could still be fair.27
Executive compensation implicates the duty of loyalty and the
obligation of fairness. In almost all large public companies, the CEO sits
on the board and is in a position to influence the amount authorized.28 The
presence of the interested influence imposes on the board the obligation of
showing fairness. Two recent Delaware cases illustrate the application of
the entire fairness standard in the context of executive compensation.

23. Valeant Pharms. Int’l, 921 A.2d at 746 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
711 (Del. 1983)). Fair dealing could demonstrate fair price. Id.
24. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710.
25. Entire fairness requires a review of “all aspects” of the transaction. See In re TD, 938
A.2d at 667 (“Equally fundamental is the notion that fair price and fair dealing are not viewed in
isolation, but rather in conjunction, and that fairness as to one prong will not necessarily sterilize a
transaction or immunize a defendant from liability.”); see also Int’l Telecharge, Inc. v. Bomarko,
Inc., 766 A.2d 437, 440 (Del. 2000) (determining entire fairness “without focusing on one
component over another”).
26. Valeant Pharms. Int’l, 921 A.2d at 746. Fair dealing “informs the court as to the fairness
of the price obtained through that process.” Id.
27. See id. at 748 (“It is possible that the pricing terms were so fair as to render the
transaction entirely fair.”). See also Oliver v. Boston Univ., No. 16570-NC, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS
75, at *25 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2007).
[T]hus, the only harm suffered by the Plaintiffs was a procedural one. Therefore,
although the BU Defendants did breach their duty of loyalty and were unable to
demonstrate the entire fairness of the Series B and C transactions, for purposes of
assessing the fiduciaries’ treatment of these claims in the context of negotiating the
Accord Agreement, the Court does not find it appropriate to assign anything but
nominal damages to these breaches.
Id. Thus, in Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989), the Delaware
Supreme Court indicated that a board’s obligations under Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes
Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985) could be met where “the directors possess a body of reliable
evidence with which to evaluate the fairness of a transaction.” Oliver, No. 16570-NC, 2006 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 75, at *25. In those circumstances, they “may approve that transaction without
conducting an active survey of the market.” Id.
28. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPENSATION SURVEY
26 (2008). The presence on the board enables the CEO to influence the compensation process.
Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that the CEO in fact always exercises that authority.
See Steven M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615,
1642-43 (2005) (“At the same time, however, their more ambitious claim that managerial power is
‘pervasive,’ and thus broadly explanatory of executive compensation practices remains
contested.”).
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Julian v. Eastern States Development 29 involved a dispute among three
brothers conducting business together.30 Two sat on the board of Benchmark and, after a meeting of “less than a half an hour” attended by “no legal
or financial advisors,” they voted themselves substantial bonuses.31 In the
ensuing litigation, the directors had the burden of showing the fairness of
the payments.32
The directors argued that bonuses were ordinary and that the amounts
were in return for the company’s “good year.”33 The court conceded a preexisting practice of paying bonuses but viewed the amounts as uncharacteristically large.34 The court found that:
From 1999 through 2004, [Company’s] bonuses as a percentage of
adjusted income hovered between 3.30% and 3.36%. In contrast,
the challenged 2005 bonuses constituted 22.28% of adjusted
income. Additionally, 2005 marked the first time [the non-brother
director] received a bonus beyond the performance-based compensation set forth in his Employment Agreement.35
These amounts were not sufficiently explained by the company’s “good
year.”36 “Regarding the reward for a good year, Benchmark had a better
year in 2004 than 2005, and the bonuses in 2004 were still only 3.36% of
adjusted income.”37 The court held that the board had not met its burden of
showing fairness.38
29. No. 1892-VCP, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2008).
30. Julian, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86, at *1.
31. Id. at *5.
32. Id. at *17. Without a majority of independent directors, the board retained the burden of
establishing fairness. Had there been a majority, the court would have reviewed the bonuses
under the duty of care.
33. Id. at *5.
34. Id. at *19.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. See J. Robert Brown, Pangloss, Delaware Law, and the Duty of Loyalty: Julian v.
Eastern States Development Co., Aug. 25, 2008, http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemptionof-delaware-law/pangloss-delaware-law-and-the-duty-of-loyalty-julian-v-easte.html (discussing
Julian).
38. The court also indicated concern with process. Julian, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS, at *18.
The circumstances of the Benchmark Bonuses give rise to suspicion about their fairness. Eleven days after Gene submitted his letter of retirement and resignation from
ESDC and ESCS, the Benchmark board approved the Benchmark Bonuses. Francis
initiated the process just days after Gene’s notice of retirement. He approached
Richard before the December 20, 2005 [,] board meeting and proposed making the
bonuses. The brothers discussed the concept for fifteen minutes, and consulted no one
else. Francis and Richard concede that they knew any bonus would decrease the net
book value of Benchmark, consequently decreasing the value of the shares they
contemporaneously were trying to force Gene to sell back.
Id.
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Similarly, in Valeant Pharmaceuticals International v. Jerney,39 the
board of ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc. voted to pay its directors large bonuses
in connection with a corporate restructuring.40 ICN earned a substantial
portion of its earnings from royalties on the sale of Ribavirin, an antiviral
drug.41 Following pressure from an activist shareholder, the board opted to
spin off the Ribavirin assets and scheduled an initial public offering (IPO)
for the subsidiary.42 Estimates indicated that the offering would yield a
market value for the subsidiary of between $2.25 billion and $3 billion.43 In
fact, the IPO proved less successful than anticipated, with the market value
at approximately half that amount.44
The compensation committee authorized bonuses for the responsible
officers and directors totaling more than $50 million.45 Problems existed
with both the process and the factors used to compute the bonuses.46 It was
the CEO, rather than the committee, who largely determined the size of the
bonus pool.47 The compensation consultant was chosen by the board48 and
employed what turned out to be incorrect valuations.49 Finally, the
directors on the committee shared in the bonuses and, during the same

39. 921 A.2d 732 (Del. Ch. 2007).
40. Valeant Pharms. Int’l, 921 A.2d at 735.
41. Id. at 736.
42. Id. at 737.
43. Id. at 737-38.
44. Id. at 738. The second step spinoff never occurred. ICN eventually repurchased the
shares sold in the IPO through a $6.25 per share tender offer. Id. at 742.
45. Id. at 738. In addition, two of the three directors had ties to the CEO. Id.
46. Id. at 739. “Self-interested compensation decisions made without independent protections are subject to the same entire fairness review as any other interested transaction.” Id. at 745.
47. Id. at 746-47. The court described the process as “designed simply to justify a predetermined outcome.” Id. at 747; see also id. at 748-49.
The committee did not examine afresh the question of whether any bonus arrangement
was appropriate and, if so, how much and what form of bonus to award. This can be
seen in the April 2 meeting minutes where the committee began their consideration by
discussing ‘[t]he question of what rationale is appropriate to support the award . . . .’
The other minutes are replete with suggestions by Moses, in particular, of possible
explanations both for awarding sizeable bonuses and for paying a large portion of any
award to Panic.
Id.
48. Id. at 739. The report also did not consider certain other recent compensation studies
performed for ICN. These studies, relied on by the plaintiff, indicated that the CEO’s total direct
compensation was twenty-seven percent higher than the 75th percentile and fifty-one percent
higher than the median among CEOs in ICN’s peer group. Id. at 740-41.
49. Id. “Finally, and perhaps most perniciously, the board, the compensation committee, and
outside experts were given and relied on inflated and misleading information provided by
management led by a recalcitrant CEO who stood to benefit most from the transaction.” Id. at
748.
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period, were negotiating with the CEO over future consulting
arrangements.50
Problems likewise existed with the factors used to calculate the
bonuses.51 ICN had a history of incentive payments for “extraordinary
transactions.”52 The restructuring bonuses were, however, unusually
large.53 They were computed using what turned out to be wildly inaccurate
valuations.54 Neither the board nor the compensation consultant could point
to similar sized bonuses in comparable transactions.55
The board was unable to point to any source of value that justified the
payments.56 According to the court:
Thus, the bonuses were awarded essentially for taking the biggest
piece of an already public company and reissuing it as a new
public stock. Moreover, the bonuses in question were being paid
to parent company managers who would have no further involvement in the “spun” company. When viewed from this perspective,
it is difficult to see how such large bonuses could be justified.
Thus, it is not surprising that Towers Perrin was unable to find
comparable grant data.57
The court, therefore, found that the board had not met its burden of showing
fairness.58
Both Valeant and Julian illustrate the salutary benefit of applying the
entire fairness standard to compensation decisions. The approach imposed
modest but meaningful limits on board discretion. In both cases, the courts
had no objection to the payment of bonuses. They merely required that the
board show consistency with past practice or provide a reasonable

50. Id. at 747.
51. Id. at 749. Even with unfair process, the price still could have been fair. See id. at 748
(“The court’s finding that ICN’s management and board used an unfair process to authorize the
bonuses does not end the court’s inquiry because it is possible that the pricing terms were so fair
as to render the transaction entirely fair.”).
52. Id. at 749.
53. Id. at 750.
54. Id. The use of the $3 billion valuation alone made “the bonuses not entirely fair.” Id.
55. Id. The next day, UBS told ICN that the IPO would have to be re-priced to $10 per
share. Id. Panic was advised by two Fried Frank lawyers to have the board revisit the bonus
scheme authorization in light of the change in pricing. Id. Panic ignored this advice. Id. Although the board met to authorize the IPO pricing, it never reconsidered the amount of the bonus
award. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also id. at 749 (“Thus, while some bonus might have been appropriate, the
amount of the bonus should have been calculated with reference to the value added to ICN by the
IPO and spin-off and not the total value of Ribavirin or other assets contributed by ICN to
Ribapharm.”).
58. Id. at 750.
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explanation for any deviation, something both were unable to do. In other
words, in those two cases, entire fairness merely prevented the payment of
executive compensation that lacked the discipline of a contemporaneous
justification.
III. ELIMINATION OF FAIRNESS FROM THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
Julian and Valeant are, unfortunately, unusual cases. Compensation
and other conflict of interest transactions rarely receive the scrutiny of
entire fairness. The mild obligation for boards to justify unusually large
compensation awards is not typically part of the analysis. Instead, the
Delaware courts extend to compensation decisions the absolute protection
of the business judgment rule.59 The standard makes the substantive terms
essentially irrelevant. The number of options, the amount of salary, and the
size of the bonuses are not generally part of the analysis.60 Instead, the
matter turns on the number of “independent” directors on the board.
The Delaware courts came to this position through legerdemain. The
business judgment rule represents an over-inclusive protection designed to
protect risk taking by directors.61 Boards know that even if they take risks
that prove in hindsight to be mistaken and harmful, they will escape
liability. The presumption is not, however, designed to protect decisions
motivated by a conflict of interest.62
The Delaware courts avoided this traditional approach largely by
ignoring the existence of the conflict of interest in the decision-making
process.63 Without any real analysis, they extended the presumption of the
business judgment rule to boards containing a majority of independent
directors.64 It was as if the presence of this majority caused the taint of the

59. The halcyon days of Van Gorkom—when there was at least some possibility that the
Delaware courts would accord content to the business judgment rule—are over. See In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, passim (Del. 2008). Moreover, waiver of liability has
all but eliminated any remaining vestiges of the duty of care. See Brown & Gopalan, supra note 3
at 3, 11 n.38.
60. One need only look to Disney to see how the case turned not on the $160 million
awarded to Michael Ovitz but on the process used by the compensation committee and the board
in approving the contract. See In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 37-41, 51-55.
61. Brown, supra note 3, at 55.
62. See Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1980) (“But the business
judgment rule presupposes that the directors have no conflict of interest.”).
63. Hokanson v. Petty, No. 3438-VCS, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 182 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 2008);
see also Eliminating Fairness from the Duty of Loyalty: Hokanson v. Petty (2009),
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/eliminating-fairness-from-the-duty-of-loyaltyhokanson-v-pet.html (discussing the presence of conflicts of interest in the decision-making
process).
64. The courts have left open the possibility that a plaintiff can show that an interested party
actually exercised control over independent directors. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
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conflict to dissipate. The courts, however, did not accompany the extension
with any obligation to eliminate65 or quarantine the interested influence. 66
Indeed, the business judgment rule applied even if the interested directors
participated in the decision and voted on the final outcome.67
There are many problems with this approach. First, it makes a
mockery of the underlying rationale for the business judgment rule. By
leaving the conflict in the decision-making process, the Delaware courts
have extended the over-inclusive presumption beyond the traditional goal of
protecting risk taking to encompass decisions motivated by a conflict of
663 A.2d 1156, 1170 n.25 (Del. 1995) (“Similarly, the manipulation of the disinterested majority
by an interested director vitiates the majority’s ability to act as a neutral decision-making body.”)
(internal citation omitted); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 364 (Del. 1993) (“We
agree with defendants that the question of when director self-interest translates into board
disloyalty is a fact-dominated question, the answer to which will necessarily vary from case to
case.”). Given obvious difficulties in proof and heightened pleading standards, this rarely occurs.
See In re LNR Prop. Corp. S’holders Litig., 896 A.2d 169, 179 (Del Ch. 2005) (refusing to
dismiss a suit against individual directors in which plaintiff made allegations that the controlling
shareholders negotiated the terms of the merger).
65. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 366 n.35 (“Examples of techniques which can restrict the
influence an interested director may exert include: recusal of the interested director(s) from
participation in board meetings.”) (internal citations omitted).
66. A disinterested and independent committee would be one possible mechanism for
quarantining a conflict of interest. This has been the approach used, for example, in the context of
board consideration of derivative suits. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786 (Del.
1981).
We do not think that the interest taint of the board majority is per se a legal bar to the
delegation of the board’s power to an independent committee composed of
disinterested board members. The committee can properly act for the corporation to
move to dismiss derivative litigation that is believed to be detrimental to the
corporation’s best interest.
Id. Whether the conflict could ever be eliminated, even with a rigorous quarantine, remains an
open question. See Marsh, supra note 14, at 37-38 (discussing an early case that found it
“impossible to measure the influence” of interested directors on the board and, as a result, courts
gave little weight to disinterested approval). Delaware, however, has rejected this view. See Cede
& Co., 634 A.2d at 363.
This Court has never held that one director’s colorable interest in a challenged
transaction is sufficient, without more, to deprive a board of the protection of the
business judgment rule presumption of loyalty. Provided that the terms of 8 Del.C.
§ 144 are met, self-interest, alone, is not a disqualifying factor even for a director.
Id.
67. See Brown, supra note 3, at 55; see also E. Norman Veasey and Christine T. Di
Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing
Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761 n. 40 (2008). Whatever the source, the courts seem to
view majority independent boards as having cleansed the “taint” of the conflict of interest, but the
standard does no such thing. There is no Delaware court that requires quarantine of the conflict of
interest. Directors with the conflict can participate in the debate and even vote on the matter. See
Nebenzahl v. Miller, No. 13206, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *10-11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 1996)
(“Compliance with Section 144 provides the protection of the business judgment rule and removes
the taint of director self-interest in a transaction.”); Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 365 (“Section
144(a)(1) appears to be a legislative mandate that, under such circumstances, an approving vote of
a majority of informed and disinterested directors shall remove any taint of director or directors’
self-interest in a transaction.”).
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interest. The mere presence of a majority of “independent” directors in no
way establishes that the decision was unaffected by the interested
influence.68
Second, whatever benefits flow from the presence of independent
directors, the Delaware courts have done little to ensure that directors are in
fact independent. They routinely ignore facts that suggest a lack of independence, employing excessive pleading standards and inconsistent tests.69
The courts categorically decline to consider relationships arising from structural bias and largely ignore friendship as a basis for finding a disqualifying
relationship.70 Boards characterized as independent, therefore, may in fact
have a majority of directors subject to the control and influence of the CEO.
Third, the business judgment rule requires that directors be informed.71
A growing body of evidence suggests that, in the context of executive compensation, the decisions are uninformed. To support compensation decisions, boards (or compensation committees) typically rely on reports from
consultants.72 Compensation consultants often are not neutral, independent
advisors, but advocates for the CEO. In those circumstances, their role may
be less about fairness and more about providing a post hoc justification for

68. Said another way, the independent directors are not hermetically sealed from the
interested directors. See William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over
Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW.
1287, 1308 (2001).
[A]lthough most public company boards have a majority of independent directors,
those directors are not hermetically sealed off from the inside directors. It is
commonplace for outside directors to have social, and in some cases business,
relationships (e.g., a partner in the company’s outside law firm or investment bank
serving as a director).
Id.
69. Delaware courts use a subjective standard but typically refuse to allow plaintiffs to use
discovery to explore each director’s unique circumstances with respect to independence.
70. This type of “structural bias” has been summarily rejected by the Delaware Supreme
Court. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004) (characterizing arguments based
upon “structural bias” as presupposing that “the professional and social relationships that naturally
develop among members of a board impede independent decision-making.”). Foreign regulators,
however, take a different view and often specify that a director loses his or her independence after
a particular number of years on the board of directors.
71. See Smith v. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d 858, 885-88 (Del. 1985) (discussing the facts relied
upon by trial courts in finding boards of directors made informed business judgments).
72. According to one report, 207 out of the Fortune 250 used compensation consultants in
2006. STAFF OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, EXECUTIVE
PAY: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AMONG COMPENSATION CONSULTANTS 7 (Comm. Print 2007),
available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071205100928.pdf [hereinafter EXECUTIVE
PAY]; see also Brian D. Cadman, Mary Ellen Carter & Stephen A. Hillegeist, The Role and Effect
of Compensation Consultants on CEO Pay (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1103682 (noting that 86% of 880 companies studied used
compensation consultants).
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predetermined amounts of compensation.73 In addition, they may have
other business relationships with the company that impairs neutrality. As
one study of compensation practices noted:
The concern arises from the fact that many compensation consultants work for diversified human resources consulting firms that
have developed strong ties to management by providing other noncompensation-related services to their corporate clients, including
actuarial services, information technology services, risk management and insurance underwriting, health and welfare services, tax
and legal advice and outsourcing. The fees earned for these services are often significantly higher than the fees earned for executive compensation consulting services provided to the compensation committee.74
Hearings in Congress on the role of compensation consultants produced a report suggesting wide spread conflicts of interest. According to
the Committee Report: “The fees earned by compensation consultants for
providing other services often far exceed those earned for advising on executive compensation.”75 At the same time, over two-thirds of the Fortune
250 companies analyzed in one study hired compensation consultants with
conflicts of interest and did not disclose the conflicts in their SEC filings.76
Yet companies need not disclose the reports or significant information
about their relationship with the consultants, including possible conflicts of
interest.77 Similarly, companies have no obligation to reveal the CEO’s role
73. The court in Valeant stated that the role of the compensation consultant was to “justify a
predetermined outcome.” Valeant Pharms. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 748 (Del. 2007).
Similarly, this seemed to be the case at Countrywide. See William Garehime, Congress, CEO Pay
and the Use of Compensation Consultants, Mar. 17, 2008, http://www.theracetothebottom.org/
executive-comp/2008/3/17/congress-ceo-pay-and-the-use-of-compensation-consultants.html
(discussing how the CEO of Countrywide used the consultant to achieve “maximum opportunity”).
74. SHEARMAN & STERLING, supra note 28, at 10. The Shearman and Sterling report noted
that only a small number of companies have adopted a policy requiring compensation consultant
independence, including Wachovia Corporation, The Procter & Gamble Company, Pfizer, Inc.,
Sprint Nextel Corporation, The Home Depot, Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc. Id. at 13.
75. See EXECUTIVE PAY, supra note 72, at i; See also SHEARMAN & STERLING, supra note
28, at 12 (“The fees earned by compensation consultants for ‘other services’ often far exceeded
fees earned for compensation consulting. In 2006, consultants received fees for ‘other services’
($2.3 million) from each client that were more than ten times greater than fees for executive
compensation consulting services ($220,000)”).
76. See EXECUTIVE PAY, supra note 72, at i-ii. The report concluded that there “appears to
be a correlation between the extent of a consultant’s conflict of interest and the level of CEO pay.”
Id. at ii.
77. 17 CFR § 229.407(e) (2007). Item 407(e) of Regulation S-K. Companies must disclose
the role of the compensation consultant:
[I]n determining or recommending the amount or form of executive and director
compensation, identify such consultants and state whether such consultants are
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in selecting the firm.78 It is shareholders that have the burden of demonstrating the uninformed nature of the decision. The shareholders must do so
without affirmative disclosure by companies or the benefit of discovery. 79
In other words, the compensation decision may well be uninformed but
pleading burdens prevent adequate exploration of the issue.
How this works in practice can be seen from the analysis in Valeant.
Because of the unusual application of the entire fairness standard, the board,
rather than shareholders, retained the burden.80 As a result, the discovery
process uncovered substantial problems with the method of selecting the
consultant and the consultant’s report.81 The consultant had largely been
foisted on the committee82 and relied on data that ultimately proved to be
wildly inaccurate.83 A discussion draft was apparently shown to management before the compensation committee, resulting in changes.84 The
report’s conclusions about the compensation paid to the CEO of ICN did

engaged directly by the compensation committee or any other person; and describe
the nature and scope of their assignment, and the material elements of the instructions
or directions given to the consultants with respect to the performance of their duties
under the engagement.
Id.
78. There is no requirement to disclose the method used to select the consultant, including
the CEO’s role in the process. Indeed, in adopting the requirement, the SEC deleted a requirement
that would have required companies to identify “the executive officers of the company that the
compensation consultants contacted in carrying out their assignment.” Exchange Act Release No.
54302A (August 29, 2006). This requirement would have at least put into the public domain
information about the CEO’s contacts with the consultant.
79. In narrow circumstances, shareholders may be able to obtain the materials through an
exercise of inspection rights. The standards, however, are high and the costs significant. See
Cronin v. AmBase Corp., No. 342-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, at *15-17 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22,
2005) (discussing a narrow set of circumstances in which the plaintiffs were able to inspect a
corporations books and records).
80. Valeant Pharms. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 740 (Del. 2007).
81. Id.
82. See id. at 739-40 (noting that one ICN executive noted that the consultant “had looked
specifically at this issue and determined it was justified in this instance”). Indeed, language in the
opinion suggested that the consultant had prejudged the bonus issue. Id.
83. Id. at 737. The consultant relied on a $3 billion market value. Id. The ultimate value
was about half that amount. Id. When the true value was ascertained, lawyers for the CEO
recommended that the board reconsider the bonuses. See id. at 739-40 (“[The CEO] was advised
by two Fried Frank lawyers to have the board revisit the bonus scheme authorization in light of the
change in pricing. [The CEO] ignored this advice. Although the board met to authorize the IPO
pricing, it never reconsidered the amount of the bonus award.”).
84. Id. at n.9.
Interestingly, an April 5, 2002 discussion draft of the Towers Perrin report, apparently
shared with management but not with the compensation committee, suggested a
reduction in the proposed grant to [the CEO] from 5 million to 3 million options. This
suggestion led to a meeting . . . at which [the CEO] described his contributions to the
success of ICN and Ribavirin, in particular. The final [consultant] report supports and
award to [the CEO] at the [$]5 million option level.
Id.
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not take into account his recently amended compensation agreement.85 Had
shareholders retained the burden, much of this information would never
have become available and the opinion of the compensation consultant
would have been entitled to deference.
IV. RETURNING FAIRNESS TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Where does this leave executive compensation? Because of the
approach taken by the Delaware courts, entire fairness is rarely used in
assessing compensation decisions. Entire fairness is not an onerous burden,
at least in the compensation context. As Julian and Valeant illustrate,
fairness merely requires the board to justify its decision.86 Fairness could
be established by reference to a reliable market (perhaps a study of peer
companies) or a meaningful explanation of the value added by the CEO or
other relevant officer.
Even this modest standard, however, has been eliminated and replaced
by the process-driven business judgment rule. The business judgment rule
leaves the burden on shareholders. It is shareholders that must somehow
show a flawed decision making process by the board, and must do so without adequate disclosure or discovery. In other words, findings that directors
are independent and informed are less a product of examination of what
actually happened inside the boardroom than denial of access to the
information that shareholders need to address the issue.
In these circumstances, shareholders are wholly unprotected from selfserving behavior. Boards need not establish fairness. They need not justify
their decisions. Indeed, had this standard been applied to the bonuses in
Julian and Valeant, both would have been upheld. The main concern of the
courts in the two cases was the amount of the bonus. Amount is irrelevant

85. Id. at 740.
[The compensation report] reviewed past compensation practices of the company. The
report concludes that the compensation for the company’s executives, specifically [the
CEO], was within the median range of similarly situated executives. However, the
report did not consider [the CEO’s] recently amended compensation agreements. The
report also did not consider certain other recent compensation studies performed for
ICN. These studies, relied on by the plaintiff, indicate Panic’s total direct compensation was 27% higher than the 75th percentile and 51% higher than the median
among CEOs in ICN’s peer group.
Id.
86. See id. at 746-51; Julian v. Eastern States Dev., No. 1892-VCP, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86,
at *58 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2008) (“The record indicates no coherent, credible reason for the bonuses
other than in reaction to Gene's retirement.”)
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when determining the availability of the business judgment rule. The
effective result is compensation without limits.87
Reforms need to be implemented to ensure that, in the case of conflicts
of interest and executive compensation in particular, the interests of
shareholders are adequately protected. To do so requires two broad changes
to existing fiduciary standards. First, steps must be taken to ensure the
efficacy of the process surrounding the approval of conflict of interest
transactions, including executive compensation. Second, fairness must
again become part of the duty of loyalty.
With respect to process, there are some modest changes that would
improve but not fix the system. The excessive pleading standards employed by the Delaware courts must be reduced.88 Allegations of friendship
from national magazines 89 or evidence of large payments to an organization
employing the director90 ought to be enough to survive a motion to
dismiss.91 Shareholders should be allowed to use discovery to uncover the
true state of affairs.92
The same should be true of informed decision-making. Even modest
evidence that the directors rushed the decision or lacked neutral advisors
should allow shareholders to escape a motion to dismiss and obtain
discovery.
More importantly, the burden should be shifted to the board to show
the presence of independent and informed decision-making. After all, it is
the board that is relying on proper process to obtain the protections of the
business judgment rule. This would significantly change the approach in
the executive compensation area. The board would need to show that the
interested influence was excluded from the process. Boards would almost

87. See Brown, supra note 3, at 58 (noting that there is a theoretical limit: waste). The
standard for establishing waste is so difficult that it has no real bearing on compensation
decisions. Id.
88. See id. at 85-93 (discussing excessive pleading standards employed by Delaware courts
in derivative suits).
89. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004) (evidence of friendship of
director in part derived from interview in national magazine).
90. See Brown, supra note 3, at 76-78 (discussing difficulty in showing that directors
materially benefited from payments to an organization).
91. See id. at 99 (“Moreover, the test for independence and the restrictive (indeed, in some
cases, impossible) pleading standards all but ensures that these "independent" majorities will in at
least some instances not be independent at all. The result is that the almost insurmountable
presumption of the business judgment rule applies to transactions approved by interested boards.
Therefore, in the context of the duty of loyalty, fairness no longer matters.”) (footnote omitted).
92. Of course, the test for independence should be applied consistently. To the extent
looking to the materiality of a financial relationship with the company, there is no reason to
exclude consideration of fees. See Brown, supra note 3, at 72 (noting that Delaware courts do not
apply materiality analysis to fees paid to directors).
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certainly need to follow the special litigation committee model and rely on
an approval process that involved independent directors with independent
advisers.93 Directors with a conflict of interest would no longer be allowed
to participate in the decision-making process.94
The shift would also require the board to demonstrate that the decision
was informed.95 In any subsequent litigation, it would be the board that
would have to produce the consultant report, disclose any conflicts, and
justify the informed and neutral nature of the advice.96 The burden would
push boards to use compensation consultants who were free of conflicts of
interest with the CEO or the company.
These changes, however, would only go so far. As the special litigation committee context has shown, courts can still make it difficult for
shareholders to establish a lack of independence and informed decisionmaking. In other words, even with the benefit of discovery and a shift in
the burden, there is no guarantee that the process will function properly to
protect shareholders.
The more radical change, therefore, needs to be an explicit return of
fairness to the analysis. No matter what procedures are employed, it is
simply not possible to entirely insulate a board from the influence of the
CEO or other interested directors.97 If for no other reason than directors
know that they will have to interact together in the future, independent
committees will always hesitate to take positions antagonistic to the CEO.98

93. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 925-28 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(discussing the stricter requirements imposed in connection with a special litigation committee).
Stock exchange traded companies already must have compensation committees consisting entirely
of independent directors. See NYSE Rule 303A.05, available at http://www.nyse.com/
Frameset.html?nyseref=http%3A//www.nyse.com/regulation/nyse/1101074746736.html&display
Page=/lcm/lcm_subsection.html. Delaware and the exchanges, however, do not use the same
definition of “independent.” See Brown, supra note 3, at 70. Moreover, the exchanges do not
exclude the CEO from participation or require neutral advisors. See NYSE Rule 303A, available
at http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?nyseref=http%3A//www.nyse.com/regulation/nyse/11010
74746736.html&displayPage=/lcm/lcm_subsection.html.
94. See Beam, 845 A.2d at 1055 (“Unlike the demand-excusal context, where the board is
presumed to be independent, the SLC has the burden of establishing its own independence by a
yardstick that must be ‘like Caesar’s wife’—above reproach.”).
95. See Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399-VCL, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 59, at *3 (Del. Ch.
May 29, 2008) (finding the board had the burden of establishing reasonableness of process used
by special litigation committee).
96. See Gesoff v. IIC Indus., 902 A.2d 1130, 1147 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“As has been repeatedly
held, special committee members should have access to knowledgeable and independent advisors,
including legal and financial advisors.”).
97. See Brown, supra note 3, at 56 (discussing impossibility of entirely excluding interested
influence from decision making process on the board of directors); MACEY, supra note 5, at 59
(labeling this “cognitive bias”).
98. This is the fundamental point made by Jon Macey when he contends that boards have
been “captured” by management. See MACEY, supra note 5, at 51-68.
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Recognizing this reality does not mean that special committees and
independent approval mechanisms should be avoided. Instead, they should
be encouraged. It does, however, make application of the duty of care an
inappropriate standard for assessing the conflict of interest. Independent
approval of conflict of interest transactions should merely shift the burden
of proof. Rather than the board having to establish fairness, shareholders
would have to show unfairness. While this would be a tougher standard
than the one traditionally applied to the duty of loyalty, it would continue to
make the terms of the transaction relevant.
In fact, the Delaware courts have done exactly this. In conflict of
interest transactions between the company and a controlling shareholder—
something that commonly arises in the context of parent/subsidiary
merger—courts allow heightened process to alter the standard of review. 99
Rather than apply the business judgment rule, however, shareholders have
the burden of showing the unfairness of the transaction.100 In other words,
fairness and the terms of the transaction continue to matter.
The same standard should be applied to all conflict of interest
decisions, including compensation decisions. The approach would likely
increase the challenges to board approval of compensation decisions and
other conflict of interest transactions. As a practical matter, however,

99. See In re LNR Prop. Corp. S’holders Litig., 896 A.2d 169, 177 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[T]he
business judgment rule does not protect the board’s decision to approve a merger (even where a
majority of the directors are independent and disinterested) where a controlling shareholder has a
conflicting self-interest.”).
100. See In re Cysive, Inc., S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 547 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“Under that
standard, the plaintiffs can succeed only if they show that the independent board majority or
committee approval was somehow obtained by fraud or coercion on the part of Carbonell or Lund,
or that the independent directors violated their duty of care or acted in bad faith.”); In re Trans
World Airlines, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 9844, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, at *20 (Del. Ch. Oct.
21, 1988) (stating that approval by independent negotiating committee results in a “burden
shifting effect” with respect to “the entire fairness of the transaction”). This is true whether
disinterested approval is by directors or shareholders. See In re LNR, 896 A.2d at 178 n.52.
While the initial burden of establishing entire fairness rests on the defendant party, an
approval of the transaction by an independent and disinterested board or Special
Committee, as well as an informed majority of minority vote, shifts the burden of
proof on the issue of fairness to the challenging shareholder plaintiffs.
Id.; see also Rosser v. New Valley Corp., No. 17272-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, at *18 (Del.
Ch. May 27, 2005).
On the other hand, if implementation of the Plan is considered to be the result of
actions taken by a controlling shareholder group, the effect of approval by fully
informed and disinterested shareholders may simply be to shift to the Plaintiff the
burden of demonstrating that the transaction was not entirely fair.
Id. A recent Delaware court, however, suggested that the appropriate standard of review for a
recommendation by a special committee might be an open question. See Krasner v. Moffett, 826
A.2d 277, 286 (Del. 2003) (“Beyond that, it is premature to determine the legal effect—and the
resulting standard of review—that would apply if a special committee that operated independently
recommended a merger to the full board.”).
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shareholders would only have a realistic chance of successfully challenging
compensation decisions that, like those in Julian and Valeant, were
substantial in amount and not properly justified by the board.
In other words, the standards would increase the risk of liability in a
meaningful respect only for outliers, compensation decisions that exceeded
all reasonable boundaries. As a practical matter, this would force compensation committees and boards to limit compensation to a more traditional
and predictable range, tracking the practices of others in the same industry.
It would result in a more cautious approach, bringing compensation
decisions into greater alignment with the interests of shareholders.
V. CONCLUSION
The financial turmoil that began in fall of 2008 illustrated the out-ofcontrol nature of executive compensation.101 The federal government chose
to remedy the situation by imposing relatively weak limitations on the
compensation paid by the companies participating in the bailout.102 The
provisions were notable for their efforts for the first time in setting federal
standards for determining compensation.103 Nonetheless, they did little to
alter the existing dynamic in the boardroom with respect to compensation
decisions.104
Similarly, the NDPTCA has not tampered with board duties.105
Instead, the Act has sought to address the issue by including provisions that
facilitate the election of directors nominated by shareholders.106 Ultimately,
this may be the only real solution. Legislative changes to fiduciary obligations will only work so well. In places such as Delaware, any legislative
101. See J. Robert Brown, Excessive Compensation and the Role of the Delaware Courts
(Part 1), Nov. 21, 2008, available at http://www.theracetothebottom.org/executive-comp/
excessive-compensation-and-the-role-of-the-delaware-courts-p.html (discussing compensation
paid to executives of financial firms and homebuilding firms over a five year period); see also J.
Robert Brown, Corporate Governance Failures and the Bailout Bill, Oct. 22, 2008,
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/securities-issues/corporate-governance-failures-and-thebailout-bill.html (describing limits on executive compensation in financial bailout legislation).
102. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (2008)
(enacted); 110 P.L. 343; 122 Stat. 3765.
103. See J. Robert Brown, Corporate Governance, the Bailout and a Lost Opportunity
(Part 2), Oct. 6, 2008, http://www.theracetothebottom.org/securities-issues/corporate-governancethe-bailout-and-a-lost-opportunity-part-1.html (describing the limited nature of executive
compensation reforms in financial bailout legislation). Until these provisions, federal efforts to
reign in executive compensation had been limited to changes in the tax treatment of payments
rather than efforts to directly affect the amounts involved. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2008).
104. See J. Robert Brown, Delaware Courts and the Influence of Federal Preemption
(Part 1), Dec. 15, 2008, http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/
delaware-courts-and-the-influence-of-federal-preemption-part-1.html.
105. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
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change would still have to confront the pro-management bias of the
courts.107 Probably the only way to truly protect the interests of shareholders is to give them the authority to elect their own candidates to the
board.108 This would not only insert shareholder advocates into the boardroom, but also focus the attention of the other directors on shareholder
interests as a means of avoiding a proxy fight.
Nonetheless, this is a long-term solution. The hostility and antagonism
to the SEC’s modest proposal to provide large shareholders of public
companies access to the company’s proxy statement, a right provided under
the NDPTCA, show that changes to the composition of the boardroom will
not happen anytime soon.109 Short term fixes to the board’s fiduciary duties
through additional, affirmative obligations and increasing the risk of
liability are the only meaningful ways to begin the process of limiting
executive compensation and protecting the interests of shareholders.110

107. See J. Robert Brown, Delaware, the Courts, and the Race to the Bottom, Mar. 12, 2008,
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/delaware-the-courts-and-therace-to-the-bottom.html (discussing non-legal reasons why Delaware benefits from companies
incorporating in state); see also J. Robert Brown, Delaware Judges, Shareholder Rights, and the
Appearance of Bias (Part 5), Mar. 11, 2008, http://www.theracetothebottom .org/preemption-ofdelaware-law/delaware-judges-shareholder-rights-and-the-appearance-of-bia-4.html (discussing
views of a Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Chancery Court on corporate governance issues).
108. J. Robert Brown, Jr., The SEC, Corporate Governance, and Shareholder Access to the
Board Room, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1339, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1095032.
109. Id. at 1380 n. 224.
110. Even for those recognizing the problem of board capture, this is not the only solution.
Jon Macey at Yale sees the solution as an increase in takeovers. See MACEY, supra note 5, at 5168.

